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Abstract
We study whether pessimism and optimism about the future by forward looking agents
provides a rationale for social security. We first distinguish between an agent’s true and pessimistic
preferences and then analyze whether this agent’s level of saving depends on the pessimism
parameter  and how welfare measured by the agent’s true preferences depends on  Next, we
examine whether it is possible for pessimism to increase the agent’s true utility and then show that
this kind of pessimism does not provide a rationale for social security. Moving on to optimism, we
study the need for a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system when the agent is optimistic
about the generosity of the PAYG system. This optimism is modeled with a parameter  In this
setting, we first study the impact that an increase in  has on the agent’s saving and then examine
whether this agent’s welfare increases or decreases in  Finally, we show that this kind of
optimism does not justify the presence of the PAYG social security system. 
Keywords: Optimism, Overlapping Generations, Pessimism, Saving, Social Security 
JEL Codes: H55, R28
4The term “social security” is often used to refer to pensions and to the provision of other benefits such as unemployment and health
benefits. Even so, we shall use the terms “social security” and “pensions” interchangeably in this paper. 
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See Kotlikoff (1987), Feldstein and Leibman (2002), Sabelhaus and Topoleski (2007), Hindriks and Myles (2013, pp. 775-807), and
the many references in these sources for a detailed perspective on the literature on social security.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Overview
The question of whether and how best to provide social security (pensions)4 to retired
citizens is one that has greatly concerned governments in different regions of the world. As noted
by Hindriks and Myles (2013, p. 775), this concern arises in part because “the issues that are raised
with pensions are the potential transfers of resources between generations and the effect on savings
behavior in the economy.” In addition, retired persons in many developed countries—such as the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) in the United States—have formed lobbying
groups that actively seek to promote their welfare. Given the practical significance of social security,
economists have analyzed the provision of pensions and the reform of pension systems from a
variety of perspectives. Therefore, there is now a vast literature on this subject. We now briefly
summarize the more recent literature to give the reader a sense for some of the issues that
researchers have grappled with.5 
Focusing on the Netherlands, Van Sonsbeek (2010) studies how the ageing of the population
affects the sustainability of public finances. He first shows that under certain conditions, the pension
costs of the state rise less slowly than the number of pensioners and then examines the budgetary
and labor participation effects of five pension reform policies. Raab (2011) studies the pay-as-you
go (PAYG) pension system in Austria and demonstrates that the behavioral responses of pensioners
to financial incentives are not only large but also differentiated by gender.
4Behaghel and Blau (2012) study one way to reform social security in the United States (US)
by varying the so called full retirement age. The key finding emanating from their study is that
retirement behavior in the US is characterized by the presence of framing effects. Boersch-Supan
(2013) concentrates on the challenges faced by the governments of nations with ageing populations
and points to the salience of what he calls “negative behavioral effects” in pension design.
Specifically, he contends that such effects can be minimized by debunking false beliefs about ageing
and, at the same time, providing better information about the chances and the challenges associated
with the process of ageing.
It is well known in the US that claiming social security benefits before reaching the full
retirement age can permanently lower benefits. As such, Knoll and Olsen (2014) show that a delay
in claiming benefits leads to larger increases in both monthly and lifetime benefits than what would
be possible with an incentive scheme that alters the early retirement reductions. Reyers et al. (2015)
use South African data and show that behavioral factors play an important role in predicting
retirement behavior. Specifically, these researchers contend that behavioral factors related to
bounded rationality and computational complexity in the decision-making environment influence
the decision to either access or not access accumulated retirement funds when changing jobs. 
1.2. A key lesson and this paper’s contribution
An important lesson emerging from the above review of the recent literature on pensions is
that behavioral factors have a substantial impact on decision-making by agents. In a recent paper,
Hollanders (2015) draws on the prior research of Cronqvist and Thaler (2004), Benartzi and Thaler
(2007), and Willis (2011) and credibly supports this perspective. He convincingly argues that
because choices by agents are affected by framing, because agents do not have much financial
5knowledge, and because agents do not choose actively, discussions about social security and social
security reform by policymakers ought to be informed by the findings of behavioral economics. 
Having said this, it should be clear to the reader that a variety of behavioral factors can
influence decision-making by agents in the context of social security. Therefore, to fix ideas and to
point to the contribution of this paper, we focus on the notion of myopia. As pointed out initially by
Feldstein (1985) and more recently by Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011), myopia or
shortsightedness in decision-making by forward looking agents can provide a rationale for the
existence of social security. The logic behind this result is as follows. Left to their own devices and
because they are shortsighted, a substantial number of agents will save inadequately. Therefore, in
such a situation, a paternalistic government can increase the welfare of such shortsighted agents by
instituting a PAYG pension system. 
We adapt the theoretical framework in Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011) and in Hindriks
and Myles (2013, pp. 781-807) and use a simple, two-period overlapping generations model—on
which more below in section 2—to study two types of deviations from perfect foresight that have,
to the best of our knowledge, not been studied adequately in the extant literature. The first type of
deviation we study is the myopia or shortsightedness that leads to the undervaluation of future
consumption. We refer to this type of deviation as pessimism. The logic here is that young agents
do not adequately think about the twin facts that they will age and that their health will decline in
the future because such thinking makes them pessimistic about their future. The second type of
deviation we analyze is the overvaluation of the benefits from an existing PAYG pension system and
we refer to this type of deviation as optimism. In this case, the logic is that young agents think they
will be richer in the future—possibly because of ongoing economic growth—and hence they are
6This model has been used routinely in the macroeconomics and public finance literatures. For textbook expositions of the model,
see Hindriks and Myles (2013, pp. 753-773) and Romer (2012, pp. 77-100).
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unrealistically optimistic about the generosity of the PAYG pension system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the two-period
overlapping generations theoretical framework. Section 3 analyzes the case of pessimism in detail
and then answers the question as to whether pessimism provides a rationale for social security.
Section 4 examines the case of optimism at length and then sheds light on the question as to whether
optimism provides a justification for PAYG social security. Section 5 concludes and then offers two
suggestions for extending the research described in this paper.
2. The Theoretical Framework
Our framework involves working with a standard overlapping generations model. Since this
model is well known, in what follows, we shall be brief.6 Consider an economy in which time is
discrete and the length of the unit time interval is equal to the time between the birth of one
generation and the birth of the next generation. At the beginning of each period a new generation of
young agents is born. Each agent lives for two time periods. Generation  consists of the set of agents
who are born at the beginning of period  The population in this economy at any time  consists of
young and old agents.
Each agent in our economy works only during the first time period of his or her life and
inelastically supplies one unit of labor. We can think of this unit of labor as the agent’s endowment.
Given this interpretation, the total quantity of labor in our economy is equal to the total number of
young agents. In the second period of their lives, agents are retired and hence they supply no labor.
Retired agents live off the savings they accumulated when young and working. The income earned
7by a young agent in the first period of his or her life is divided between consumption and savings.
Second period consumption or consumption while retired is equal to savings plus the interest earned
on these savings. All agents are identical with the single exception that they are born at different
points in time. 
For an agent born in time period   denotes consumption when young and  denotes
consumption when old and retired. We assume that this agent incurs no disutility from the supply of
the single unit of labor when young. In addition, for an agent born in period  let  denote his or her
savings and let  denote the income received from the supply of the single unit of labor. Therefore,
this agent’s budget constraint can be written as 
(1)
Let  denote the interest rate at which savings grow in our economy. This tells us that the value
of consumption to an agent when (s)he is retired is given by
(2)
Now, combining equations (1) and (2), the life-cycle budget constraint for our agent born in period 
is given by
(3)
8With this background in place, we are now in a position to study the phenomenon of pessimism about
the future and whether pessimism of this sort provides a rationale for social security.
3. Pessimism
3.1. Preliminaries
Consider an agent in our economy whose true preferences can be described by a utility
function that has the following Cobb-Douglas form
(4)
where the parameter  As discussed in section 1.2, this agent does not have perfect foresight
but displays myopia or shortsightedness about the future, i.e., his or her life as a retired person. This
myopia or deviation from perfect foresight leads our agent, when young, to undervalue his or her
consumption when old. We refer to this type of deviation as pessimism. 
Why is this agent pessimistic about the future? We consider two reasons. First, we model the
idea that our young agent either does not or cannot adequately think about the fact that (s)he will age
and hence get old one day . To this end, let  denote the ageing parameter. Second, we also
account for the notion that our young agent, once again, either does not or cannot satisfactorily think
about the fact that his or her health will decline when (s)he is old and retired. We denote the health
parameter by  The twin facts of ageing and health decline make our agent pessimistic about
the future and this explains why our agent undervalues his or her future consumption. 
The next question concerns the precise manner in which the ageing and the health concerns
lead our agent to undervalue his or her future consumption. We consider two cases. In the first case,
these twin concerns lead to additive discounting of second period consumption  so that this
9consumption effectively becomes  where the additive pessimism parameter  and we
need  In the second case, the above two concerns lead to multiplicative discounting of
second period consumption  so that this consumption effectively becomes  where the
multiplicative pessimism parameter  and it is clear that  
Now, as it turns out, our subsequent qualitative results are unaffected by whether the
discounting of second period consumption is additive or multiplicative. Therefore, in the remainder
of this section, we dispense with the  and the  superscripts on the pessimism parameter and work
with a single pessimism parameter  This means that the discounted or undervalued second
period consumption is given by  Given this undervaluation of second period consumption, we
can write our agent’s pessimistic preferences with a utility function that also has the Cobb-Douglas
form and is given by
(5)
Our task now is to determine how the agent’s level of saving  is impacted by the pessimism
parameter  
3.2. Pessimism and saving
To determine this impact, we solve our agent’s constrained utility maximization problem,
recognizing that the appropriate utility function is the one depicting this agent’s pessimistic
preferences. Specifically, this agent solves 
(6)
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subject to the budget and value of consumption constraints given in equations (1) and (2)
respectively. We shall set the value of  in equation (1) equal to unity and the reader should note that
this is without any loss of generality. The Lagrangian function for the above maximization problem
can be written as 
(7)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint given in equation (1).
The first order necessary conditions for an optimum are
(8)
(9)
and
(10)
Manipulating equations (8), (9), and (10), we get 
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 and (11)
Inspecting equation (11), it is clear that the level of saving when young or  is independent
of the pessimism parameter  Therefore, we conclude that pessimism about the future does not
impact our agent’s level of saving. We now analyze the way in which this agent’s level of welfare
measured by his or her true preferences is affected by the pessimism parameter  
3.3. Pessimism and welfare
Inspecting equation (4), we see that our agent’s true preferences are independent of the
pessimism parameter  From this it clearly follows that pessimism about the future has no effect
on this agent’s level of welfare as measured by his or her true preferences. 
Now suppose that the economy under study consists of a total number of  agents and that
these agents all act in accordance with their pessimistic preferences. Further, suppose that the
equilibrium interest rate in our economy is given by  where  is the aggregate level of
savings in our economy and  are positive constants. Can pessimism about the future ever increase
the true utilities of all the agents in this economy? We answer this question next.
3.4. Pessimism and true utilities
We begin by reiterating that the pessimism about the future that we are studying in this paper
does not alter the saving decision of an individual agent. Therefore, it follows that the aggregate level
of savings in our economy is also unaffected by pessimism. Looked at a little differently, in solving
their individual utility maximization problems, agents treat the interest rate as exogenous to their
decision-making. As such, each agent selects his or her own level of saving without considering how
the aggregate level of savings influences the equilibrium interest rate. 
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Now, from our analysis thus far in sections 3.1 to 3.3, we can write the representative agent’s
true preferences as 
(12)
We also know that the equilibrium interest rate is given by  and that the aggregate level of
savings equals  Substituting these last two expressions in equation (12) and then
simplifying, we get 
(13)
Inspecting equation (13), it is clear that the true utilities of the  agents in our economy do
not depend on the pessimism parameter  Therefore, it follows that pessimism about the future can
never increase the true utilities of these agents. Our final task in this section is to answer the
following important question. Does pessimism about the future provide a rationale for social
security?
3.5. Pessimism and social security
We begin our answer to the above question by first pointing to two salient results from the
literature. The relatively early literature on this topic, beginning with the seminal work of Feldstein
(1985), has shown that myopia alone can provide a rationale for a PAYG social security system but
the provision of this kind of social security reduces and can even crowd out private saving. More
recently, Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011, p. 137) have demonstrated that with myopia, “if private
saving is positive...the optimal public pension is zero.” 
Now, from the discussion in section 3.4 we know that pessimism about the future does not
affect the representative agent’s saving decision, the aggregate level of savings in our economy, and
7The case we are studying is the opposite of the “pension pessimism” case first studied by Feldstein (1985).
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it can also never raise the true utilities of any of the agents in our economy. We also know that the
aggregate level of savings equals  These results together provide additional support
for the finding in Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011) mentioned in the preceding paragraph and tell
us that pessimism about the future does not provide a rationale for social security in the economy
under consideration. We now proceed to analyze the phenomenon of optimism and whether optimism
of a particular sort  provides a justification for social security. 
4. Optimism
4.1. Preliminaries
Consider an economy of the sort studied above in section 3. Once again, consider an agent
whose true (non-optimistic) preferences can be described by a utility function that has the following
natural logarithmic form
(14)
We suppose that a PAYG pension system is presently in place in this economy. However, in contrast
with the pessimism displayed by the agents in section 3, now, possibly because of economic growth,
agents believe that they will be richer in the future and therefore they are optimistic about this future.
We model this optimism by supposing that agents overvalue the benefit from the existing
PAYG pension system and believe that the actual pension  and the social security tax  are linked
by the linear functional relationship
 (15)
where the optimism parameter 7 As in section 3, we abstract away from population growth and
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hence the true value of the pension  With the PAYG pension system in place, the budget
constraint for an agent displaying no optimism is given by
(16)
where the left-hand-side (LHS) denotes consumption over the agent’s lifetime and the right-hand-side
(RHS) denotes net income over the same lifetime. Given this setting, our task now is to determine
the impact that an increase in the optimism parameter  has on savings in the economy under study.
4.2. Optimism and saving
To ascertain this impact, we solve our agent’s constrained utility maximization problem.
Specifically, this agent solves 
(17)
subject to the budget constraint given in equation (16). The Lagrangian function for this
maximization problem is 
(18)
15
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint given in equation (16).
The first order necessary conditions for an optimum are 
(19)
(20)
and
(21)
Manipulating equations (19) and (20), we get 
(22)
Using equations (16) and (22), we get
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(23)
Because  using equation (23), it follows that
(24)
From the discussion in section 4.1, it is clear that the actual value of the pension 
However, optimistic agents believe that the value of the pension is given by equation (15). Therefore,
the saving decision of optimistic agents is given by substituting from equation (15) into equation (24).
This gives us
(25)
We can now determine the impact of an increase in the optimism parameter  on savings by partially
differentiating equation (25) with respect to  This gives us
(26)
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The sign of the partial derivative in (26) tells us that, consistent with our intuition, when agents in
our economy become more optimistic about the future, they end up saving less for this same future.
What happens to the welfare of an agent when (s)he becomes more optimistic—  increases—about
the future? We now answer this question.
4.3. Optimism and welfare
Our answer involves ascertaining the consumption trajectory and the lifetime utility of an
agent who expects to receive a pension  but, in fact, receives only  We know that our
agent’s non-optimistic consumption in the first period of his or her life is given by equation (23).
Therefore, substituting from equation (15) into (23), the optimistic agent’s first period consumption
is given by 
(27)
Similarly, this agent’s consumption when old and retired is given by
(28)
Having obtained analytic expressions for our agent’s first and second period consumption,
let us now partially differentiate this agent’s utility function. This gives us
18
(29)
Straightforward differentiation tells us that  and that
 Substituting these last two expressions in the RHS of equation
(29) and recalling that  for an optimistic agent, we get
(30)
In words, the result in (30) tells us that an increase in optimism by our agent or, alternately,
an increase in the overvaluation of the pension system’s payout lowers this agent’s welfare. This
result arises because an increase in the optimism parameter  unrealistically raises the gap between
the amount that our agent will actually receive from the PAYG pension system and the amount that
(s)he thinks (s)he will receive. Our final task in this section is to shed light on the question about
whether optimism about the future or the overvaluation of the second period payout from the existing
PAYG social security system provides a justification for the continued existence of this system. 
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4.4. Optimism and social security
The welfare of the optimistic agent when there is no social security program in place is given
by 
(31)
Using equations (27) and (28), the welfare of this same agent in the presence of the PAYG social
security system is given by
(32)
It is clear that the PAYG pension system ought to be retained in the economy under study if
it raises the welfare of an agent in this economy. For this to happen, we must have 
Using equations (31) and (32), this difference is given by 
(33)
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After several steps of algebra, equation (33) can be simplified to
(34)
Using the properties of the logarithm function and equation (34), we can tell that the difference
 is positive when
(35)
The inequality in (35) can be simplified to 
(36)
Now, from equation (24) we know that  and therefore  Clearly,  and
this tells us that  and hence that  Using this last inequality, it is obvious that the LHS
of the inequality in (36) is negative. However, the RHS of the inequality in (36) is positive. From
these last two results, it follows that the inequality in (36) is never satisfied. Therefore, the difference 
is never positive and this allows us to conclude that when our agent displays optimism of the sort
analyzed in this section, the PAYG social security system ought not to be retained. This completes
21
our analysis of pessimism and optimism by forward looking agents and the need for social security.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we studied whether pessimism and optimism about the future by forward
looking agents provided a rationale for social security. We first distinguished between an agent’s true
and pessimistic preferences and then analyzed whether this agent’s level of saving depended on the
pessimism parameter  and how welfare measured by the agent’s true preferences depended on 
Next, we examined whether it was possible for pessimism to increase the agent’s true utility and then
showed that this kind of pessimism did not provide a rationale for social security. Moving on to
optimism, we studied the need for a PAYG social security system when the agent was optimistic
about the future generosity of the PAYG system. This optimism was modeled with a parameter 
In this setting, we first studied the impact that an increase in  had on the agent’s saving and then
examined whether this agent’s welfare increased or decreased in  Finally, we showed that this kind
of optimism did not justify the presence of the PAYG social security system. 
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In what follows, we
suggest two possible extensions of this paper’s research. First, it would be useful to analyze the
rationale for social security question when this question is set in a context in which pessimism about
the future affects the saving rate of individual agents in an economy. Second, it would be helpful to
introduce population growth into the model and then study whether optimism of the sort analyzed
in this paper provides a rationale either for a PAYG pension system or a fully funded social security
system. Studies of pessimism and optimism and the provision of social security that incorporate these
aspects of the problem into the analysis will provide additional insights into an intergenerational
resource transfer problem that has significant economic and social ramifications.
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